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CHAPTER 6 
Rethinking the 3Rs: From Whitewashing to Rights 
Charlotte E. Blattner 
Postdoctoral Fellow, Harvard Law School, Cambridge MA 
charlotte.blattner@gmailcom 
1 Introduction: Widespread Acceptance and Regulatory Failure of 
the 3Rs 
Few other issues have prompted as many legislators to adopt legal instruction 
on the "proper" use of non-human animals (hereinafter referred to as animals) 
in medical and scientific research. Today, the 3Rs ( replacement, reduction, and 
refinement of animals in scientific procedures) are globally accepted by a vast 
majority of states (Blattner, 2014); and prominent international organizations, 
such as the World Organisation for Animal Health (Terrestrial Animal Health 
Code, 2018, Article 7(8)(3)) and the Council of Europe (Convention for the 
Protection of Vertebrate Animals Used for Experimental and Other Scientific 
Purposes, 1986, Articles 6(2), 7 and 8). Widespread acceptance of the 3Rs is a 
notable achievement, since animal law is a relatively young field oflaw, and at­
titudes about the human-animal relationship diverge sharply across societies. 
As progressive as this established body of law appears, the rules govern­
ing research on animals-especially the 3R maxim that dominate this legal 
landscape-suffer from regulatory failure. First, and most importantly, de­
spite widespread commitment to replace and reduce animals in research, 
the number of animals used for experimental purposes worldwide is now the 
same as it was in the 1980s ( the number dropped in the 1990s and 2000s but 
has been rising ever since; Bayne et al., 2015, p. 3; European Commission, 2013; 
Taylor, 2013; Taylor et al., 2008; Taylor and Rego, 2016). Second, though the 
principle of refinement demands that the severity of experiments be dimin­
ished, countries are reporting a rising number of research procedures done 
on animals who are forced to endure the most severe experiments ( e.g., Neue 
Zurcher Zeitung, 2016). There is reason to believe that refinement, which seeks 
to ameliorate the conditions of animals used for a research procedure, fails to 
fulfill their basic welfare needs. For example, pursuant to the United States' 
Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals, a pig who weighs up to 
50kg can be housed for up to five years on 15 square feet ( o.gm2), without any 
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access to the outside (National Research Council Institute for Laboratory Ani­
mal Research, 2011). The Guide states that thereby "animals can tum around 
and move freely without touching food or water troughs, have ready access to 
food and water, and have sufficient space to comfortably rest away from areas 
soiled by urine and feces" (p. 63). On 15 square feet, however, a pig cannot 
possibly exhibit normal behavior. No human of the same weight is expected 
to behave naturally in a o.gm2 elevator and certainly not for a period of five 
years. Overall, this overview of the achievements of the 3Rs suggests that both 
in qualitative and in quantitative terms, adopting the 3Rs has not decreased 
animal suffering. 
At the same time, societal demands for better protection of animals are 
more common than ever before (European Commission, 2016). According to 
the most recent polls, citizens are increasingly concerned about the welfare of 
animals used in science and agree that more needs to be done to replace their 
use ( Clemence and Leaman, 2016; European Citizen's Initiative, 2016; Funk and 
Rainie, 2015; Jones, 2017 ). Despite these demands and the reasonable doubts 
they cast on the potential of the 3Rs to lead to the ultimate replacement of ani­
mals in research ( see below), the 3Rs continue to be a popular policy tool for 
legislators and research facilities that use them as an example of their efforts 
to ameliorate the suffering of animals in research. The worldwide acceptance 
and simultaneous failure of the 3Rs seem to have turned the maxim, intention­
ally or not, into a means of whitewashing the images of those profiting from 
research vis-a-vis the public: scientists, research industries, and regulators. 
In light of these developments, this chapter takes a functional-comparative 
approach to scrutinize whether and how we can meet the rising societal de­
mands for replacement. It specifically examines whether the 3Rs bear the po­
tential of meeting this goal, and if so, what reforms are necessary, or whether 
the 3Rs should instead be abrogated. 
2 Abrogating the 3Rs? 
The widespread acceptance of the 3Rs, alongside their simultaneous failure, 
forces us to ask whether the 3Rs should be retired. In 2015, people across the Eu­
ropean Union (Eu) launched the European Citizens' Initiative, Stop Vivisection, 
and expressed, with over 1,150,000 signatures, their desire for a paradigm shift 
away from the use of animals. The European Citizens' Initiative is a political 
means at the EU level that makes it possible for 1 million citizens to participate 
in developing EU strategies, by prompting the European Commission (Ee) to 
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propose a legislative act. The Stop Vivisection initiative demanded the use of 
animals for research purposes be abolished, which would have necessitated 
abrogating Directive 2010/63/EU (European Parliament, 2010 ), and with it, 
the 3Rs. The EC responded to the initiative by issuing a communication that 
effectively ignored these demands, arguing that the Directive also had replace­
ment as a long-term goal, but that animal research cannot be banned because, 
"a ban [ ... ] would likely export the biomedical research and testing outside 
the Eu to countries where welfare standards may be lower and more animals 
may be needed to achieve the same scientific result" (European Commission, 
2015, p. 3). As an alternative to the proposed abrogation, the EC promised that 
it would speed up the expected progress of the 3Rs by sharing knowledge, de­
veloping and validating new alternatives, strengthening enforcement, and 
entering a dialogue with the scientific community, for example, by organiz­
ing a conference devoted to this issue ( see Holley et al., 2016, on knowledge 
sharing in the EU). Undoubtedly, these steps may help to enforce Directive 
2010/63/EU more effectively, but they do not respond to the criticism that 
the 3Rs suffer from structural deficits that lead to the perpetuation of ani­
mal use in science. In effect, the steps envisaged by the Commission, like the 
3Rs as they stand, are unlikely to bring about the full replacement of animal 
models. 
Given these economic fears and political constraints that continue to in­
form the debate on the replacement of animals in research, it may be more ef­
fective to use the worldwide acceptance of the 3Rs as a foundation for working 
towards a paradigm change, through a foot-in-the-door strategy. Theoretically, 
the 3Rs have many advantages over other types of regulatory approaches. 
They are simple and intelligible, easily understandable, and catchy. They en­
joy a general application, paired with refined conceptualization ( compared 
to the very general objective of avoiding unnecessary animal suffering that 
leaves even more room for interpretation). The 3Rs take an integrative ap­
proach by incentivizing innovation, accommodating the interests of various 
stakeholders, and not discrediting the purposes of research, such as finding 
causes, treatments, and cures for diseases or enabling novel scientific insights. 
The 3Rs consider the sentience and suffering of animals a baseline and re­
spond to the needs of animals beyond physiological suffering, such as their 
needs for social interaction and mental stimulation. Based on the hypothesis 
that the 3Rs are theoretically expedient, it is worth exploring the potential of 
this principle to mature into a more viable concept for the future of animal 
law, in particular with regard to its capacity to preempt the use of animals in 
research. 
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Most countries claim that a minimum number of animals should be used to 
obtain scientific knowledge, but the language of the replacement principle 
is regularly laxer than that of refinement. For example, in the EU, Directive 
2010/63/EU determines that "Member States shall ensure that, wherever pos­
sible, a scientifically satisfactory method or testing strategy, not entailing 
the use of live non-human animals, shall be used instead of a procedure" 
( emphasis added, European Parliament, 2010, Article 4). But given that the 
Directive fails to determine the probability of possible alternatives, how ac­
cessible they ought to be, and the need to invest into them, the norm fails to 
incentivize researchers to divest from animal research. According to Article 
13 of Directive 2010/63/EU, replacement is only necessary if alternatives are 
recognized under EU law. In addition, legislators often do not necessarily 
mean replacement in an absolute sense when they call for replacement mea­
sures; instead, the use of seemingly less sentient animals, like rodents or fish, 
are readily accepted as a form of replacement ( e.g., German Animal Welfare 
Act 2006, Section 7a(2)(5); India Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, Ani­
mal Welfare Board of India, 1982, Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1982, 
Section 7( 2 )( e ); us Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals, National 
Research Council, 2011, p. 5; Scientific Committee on Health Environmental 
and Emerging Risks, SCHEER, 2017, p. 15). 
This clearly runs counter to Russell and Burch's ( 1959) definition of replace­
ment as "any scientific method employing non-sentient material" (Chapter 5) 
and fails to give those animals, whose capacity to sentience is still disputed, 
the benefit of the doubt ( challenging the view that non-human animals lower 
on the zoological scale lack sentience: Tomasik, 2014 ). Such lax provisions give 
ample room for regulatees to avoid actual replacement, and they increase the 
possibility that certain research procedures may never be replaced. Given the 
lax practice in replacement and strong accentuation towards reduction and re­
finement, there seems to be an implicit hierarchical understanding of the 3Rs 
that gives refinement and reduction priority over replacement ( Gerritsen, 2015, 
p. 38). The marginalization of replacement is especially disconcerting if one 
looks at the 3Rs from an "animal use" perspective, as seen in Table 6.1. 
It is this framework that allows animal researchers to discharge their du­
ties under the 3Rs by engaging in refinement (and marginal reduction) alone. 
The political and legal preoccupation with refinement and reduction shifts the 
focus away from where it should be, i.e., on replacement. So, if we continue to 
accept that legislators and institutions simply refine and marginally reduce the 
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TABLE 6.1 Refinement and reduction support the use of animals for research procedures 
and only replacement bears the potential of phasing out animal research in the 
longterm. 
Refinement Reduction Replacement 
Use of animals + + 
use of animal models-only replacing them "wherever practical" and thereby 
conceiving themselves as fulfilling their 3R duties-we will end up perpetuat­
ing the use of animals in experiments. Contrary to what many practice, the 3Rs 
ought, however, be interpreted to mandate that replacement be given primary 
consideration. As the above-mentioned polls show, citizens' opinions increas­
ingly pressure legislators to come up with a workable plan to phase out the 
use of animals in research, which necessitates insisting on the replacement of 
animals in research (see also Goldberg and Locke, 2004). To bring about this 
paradigmatic change, the 3Rs should be understood hierarchically, where the 
first goal is replacement, the second reduction, and the third refinement. The 
imperative for this reversal is based on a historical, teleological, and evolution­
ary interpretation. 
A historical interpretation of the 3Rs relies on Russell and Burch's founda­
tional work on the principle. Russell and Burch, the founders of the 3Rs, clearly 
stated that the humanitarian problem lies in the severity with which animals 
encounter stress and the high number of animals affected, and that the very 
purpose of the 3Rs is to tackle these (Russell and Burch, 1959, p. 93; Blattner, 
2014). Russell and Burch further stated that "refinement is never enough, and 
we should always seek further for reduction and if possible replacement" 
(Chapter 4). Because replacement does not appear to be a priority of the 3Rs 
even though it is an explicit goal of the tripartite principle, the law must give 
more weight to this element when it applies the principle in the future. 
A teleological interpretation also suggests that the law must reverse the hier­
archy of the 3Rs. Indications of this interpretation already exist under current 
legislation. The Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of Vertebrate 
Animals used for Experimental and other Scientific Purposes states in its pre­
amble that its parties are " [ r] esolved to limit the use of animals for experi­
mental and other scientific purposes with the aim of replacing such use [ ... ] 
in particular by seeking alternative measures and encouraging the use of these 
alternative measures" (Council of Europe, 1986). In Directive 2010/63/EU, 
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the EU expressed its wish to, "achiev[ e] the final goal of full replacement of 
procedures on live animals for scientific and educational purposes" (Euro­
pean Parliament, 2010, Recital 10 ). If we interpret the 3Rs based on these 
stated purposes, replacement must be our top priority. Article 4 of Directive 
2010/63/EU, which details the 3R commitments, begins by stating the duty 
of replacement and, thereby, implies a reverse hierarchical understanding of 
the principle, as well. Article 13 of the Directive further guides the choice 
of methods in the scientific and educational use of animals and-unlike the 
previous regulation, Directive 86/609/EEC (Council of the European Com­
munities, 1986)-does not require replacement methods to be "reasonably, 
and practically available" (Article 7(2)). Instead, replacement methods are 
recognized as non-animal methods or testing strategies, even if they are not 
reasonably and practically available. This wording change, strictly interpreted, 
means alternatives should be required even where they are costly, have nev­
er been used by the researcher, or are not available at the researcher's home 
institution. 
The polls introduced herein show that the global community has never 
been more concerned about animals' well-being than it is today. As a conse­
quence of this burgeoning global conscience, we are witnessing the rise of the 
general principle of animal welfare, which is developing into a norm of cus­
tomary international law (Bowman, Davies, and Redgwell, 2010, p. 678; Brels, 
2012, p. 37; Sykes, 2014; Trent et al., 2005, p. 77 ). International documents and 
the laws of over 60 states worldwide make clear the general moral commit­
ment and the legal requirement that animals be treated humanely and spared 
suffering (Blattner, 2016, pp. 304-308). The general principle of animal welfare 
underlines the goal of animal protection as an intrinsic interest of animals. In 
other words, the suffering of animals matters to the law because it matters to 
animals (Bolliger, Richner, and Riittimann, 2011, p. 24-25, n. 14; Leondarakis, 
2001, p. 29 ). Importantly, the general principle of animal welfare not only man­
dates proper treatment of animals while using them; it also encompasses the 
aspiration of states to preempt any violation of their intrinsic interests. 
Another global principle that requires regulatory frameworks to shift empha­
sis on animal replacement is the precautionary principle. The precautionary 
principle commonly applies in decision-making processes and entails that, 
where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason to postpone cost-effective measures to 
prevent damage. The prime application of the precautionary principle is in en­
vironmental law where it covers animals who form an integral part of an eco­
system (Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987; 
United Nations, 1992, Article 8h, 14(1)( d); United Nations General Assembly, 
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1992, Article 15; World Charter for Nature, 1982, Article 12(b) ). But, as the E c 
states, "in practice, [the] scope [ of the precautionary principle] is much wider, 
and specifically where preliminary objective scientific evaluation indicates 
that there are reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially dangerous 
effects on the environment, human, animal or plant health may be inconsis­
tent with the high level of protection chosen for the Community" ( Commis­
sion of the European Communities, 2000; see also World Health Organization, 
1994, Article 5(7)). The precautionary principle demands that we err on the 
side of caution to prevent dangerous effects on animal health, replacing ani­
mals in research rather than regulating and, thus, perpetuating their use by 
refinement and reduction. We must thus decide in favor of animals wherever 
and whenever actions impair, or likely will impair, their physical and psycho­
logical health and life ( Gerick, 2005, p. 213; Kuhlau et al., 2011 ). An evolution­
ary interpretation, based on the general principle of animal welfare and the 
precautionary principle therefore indicates that replacement should be given 
primary consideration among the 3Rs. 
4 Reform Proposal 2: Qualitative Balances of Interests, Harm-Benefit 
Analyses, and Proportionality Tests 
Even if replacement is given absolute preference, the 3Rs are still likely to fail 
because in most jurisdictions they enjoy only relative validity. Researchers do 
not refine the conditions of animals, do not reduce the number of animals 
used, and do not replace animals as the primary research model ( even where 
alternatives exist) if human interests justify that decision. The Swiss Animal 
Welfare Act 2005, for example, states that " [p ]ain, suffering or harm may be 
inflicted on or anxiety caused to a non-human animal only if this is unavoid­
able for the purpose of the experiment" (Article 20(1)). The issue here is that 
the purpose of the experiment is the only determinant in deciding whether 
animal suffering is unavoidable, or so-called necessary. The suffering inflict­
ed on animals during experimentation is seen as a prima facie harm, but its 
justifiability-and hence its legality-is fully determined by the purpose of 
the experiment. Animals' interests in not suffering, by contrast, do not enter 
the judgment on necessity. 
The Swiss Animal Welfare Act seems to have taken a step in the right direc­
tion by further providing that animal experimentation is impermissible "if, in 
relation to the anticipated gain in knowledge, it inflicts disproportionate pain, 
suffering or harm [on the animal] "  (emphasis added, Article 19(4)). Similar­
ly, under the United Kingdom's Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986, the 
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Animals in Science Regulation Unit will assess whether the harms caused by an 
experiment are '1ustified by the expected outcome" ( emphasis added, Section 
5B(3)(d)). This is also the case with Article 38(1)(b) of Directive/2010/63/EU 
(European Parliament, 2010 ).  These and other laws claim that they determine 
the legality of an experiment conducted on animals not only by evaluating the 
necessity of an experiment but by weighing all interests at hand. Such norms 
bring to application what is sometimes known as the balance of interest tests, 
harm-benefit analyses, or the proportionality principle. 
Pursuant to these tests, animal experiments are evaluated in a two-step pro­
cedure. Regulators require the purpose of an experiment to be indispensable 
(final indispensability), and they require the means to achieve this end to be 
indispensable ( instrumental indispensability or harm-benefit analysis) (Pe­
ters, 2012, p. 34ff.; e.g., German Animal Welfare Act 2006, Section 7(1)(1); Swiss 
Animal Welfare Act 2005, Article 17 ). Final indispensability is an analysis of the 
purpose and legitimacy of an experiment, which answers the if question. In­
strumental indispensability, on the other hand, answers the how and largely 
refers to the principle of proportionality ( e.g., German Animal Welfare Act, 
2006, Section 7(1)(2)). The proportionality analysis includes the elements of 
suitability (means must be able to achieve desired ends), necessity (no milder 
means are available to achieve the end), and proportionality strictusensu (Bol­
liger and Riittimann, 2015, pp. 71-73). This final proportionality, strictu sensu 
evaluation includes a duty to diligently balance interests affected by the act at 
hand and conforms to the harm-benefit analysis (Ferrari and Gerritsen, 2015, 
p. 140) but with respect to means as opposed to ends. 
Let us tum to final indispensability first. Before weighing interests, decision­
making bodies usually follow a system that classifies expected harms inf­
licted on animals. For example, there is a five-step classification system in 
Canada (Canadian Council on Animal Care, 20n), in New Zealand (New Zea­
land Government, 2010, Section 2(1)), and in Israel (Kolman et al., 2014, pp. 
202-203), a four-tiered scheme in Singapore (National Advisory Committee for 
Laboratory Animal Research, 2004, Article 5(4)(2)(b)) and the EU (European 
Parliament, 2010, Articles 15 and 16); and the Philippines has a three-step pain 
categorization system (Philippines Law on the Use of Animals in Research, 1999, 
Article 5( 2) ). Most of these classification schemes determine harm or pain lev­
els based on the severity of a procedure or its duration, or a combination of the 
two. Article 15 of Directive 2010/63/EU, for example, assesses projects as non­
recovery, mild (short-term mild pain, suffering, or distress), moderate (short­
term moderate or long-lasting mild pain, suffering, or distress), and severe 
(severe or long-lasting moderate pain, suffering, or distress) (European Parlia­
ment, 2010 ). To best evaluate harm, psychological spheres of animals must also 
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be considered because inducing fear or anxiety in an animal negatively affects 
their well-being ( e.g., Council of Europe, 1979, preamble; Swiss Animal Welfare 
Act, 2005, Article 3(b )( 4) ). 
In contrast to harms, benefits are neither classified nor categorized. For 
instance, in the UK, where stricter harm-benefit analyses are said to prevail 
(Perry, 2007, p. 43), benefits are described in a very broad manner, by answering 
questions such as, what data or products may be acquired by the work, what 
scientific questions will be answered, what knowledge gaps will be filled, who 
will benefit from the work, and how and when the benefits will accrue. Quite 
telling in this respect is the need for scientists to " [  e ]xplain why the benefits 
go beyond 'it would be nice to know"' (uK Home Office, 2014, p. 126; see also 
European Parliament, 2010, Article 38(2)(a); UK Home Office, 2016, pp. 9-11). 
Scientifically speaking, to offer benefits, a research project must produce rec­
ognizable results of scientific value ( e.g., Austrian Animal Welfare Act, 2004, 
Section 4(3)(a)). From a societal perspective, however, only socially desirable 
objectives can be pursued in an experiment. Saving labor, time and costs or 
duplicating research cannot, prima facie, be weighed against animals' interests 
( e.g., German Animal Welfare Act, 2006, Section 7a( 2 )(5) ). 
Though these rules on final indispensability serve an important purpose 
and help prevent the most unnecessary and atrocious research procedures, 
they effectively leave untouched the great bulk of research. For example, the 
societal objectives of curing diseases or producing new scientific knowledge 
typically operate as a carte blanche that legitimate every form of animal ex­
ploitation and give the 3Rs only relative validity. But simply dropping the 
words cancer research cannot and should not automatically justify the use of 
animals. We must introduce a scheme that evaluates the importance of the 
research, its contribution to the expected goal, and the likelihood of its suc­
cess; and we must be wary of approving research projects that simply ensure 
a research facility's survival and the preservation of jobs, while perpetuating 
the exploitation of animals (arguing that " [c]onducting animal experiments 
is a convenient and highly effective way for these researchers to gain career 
prestige and job security, and for the universities who employ them to obtain 
lucrative research grants. There is a quid pro quo relationship between research 
institutions and those giving the grants", Greek and Greek, 2004, p.25). No 
research that goes beyond "it would be nice to know" is, by itself, morally or 
legally weighty enough to justify the immense suffering of animals in research. 
Peters (2015) proposes categorizing human interests into small, moderate, 
and great benefits to introduce a level field for evaluating human benefits 
versus animal harms (p. 97 ). Having precise knowledge about both burdens 
and benefits allows us to weigh more systematically the importance of the in­
terests at hand, and makes it more obvious when marginal scientific interests 
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seek to trump animals' fundamental interests in life and bodily and mental 
integrity. 
A further failing within harm-benefit evaluations is that the tests are regu­
larly affected by referring to the legal tools that encapsulate those interests, 
rather than by the interests themselves. Scholars and individuals around the 
world have frequently exposed the risks of endowing humans with rights, 
while endowing animals only with protections. When experiments are evalu­
ated, rights of humans, such as the freedom of research ( e.g., Council of Eu­
rope, 1950, Article 10) or the freedom to choose an occupation and the right to 
engage in work ( e.g., European Convention, 2000, Article 15), are juxtaposed 
against (animal) protections ( e.g., the 3Rs ). The fact that certain interests are 
legally recognized either as rights or as protections, establishes a disparate 
and unequal footing for the affected parties. Protections are effectively un­
dermined when confronted with rights in a balance of interests, because they 
are a weaker legal tool. Consequently, protections only take effect where the 
rights of humans leave room for them. The Swiss Animal Welfare Act (2005) is 
a prime example of this automatic trumping. It requires anyone who handles 
animals to ensure their well-being "as far as the intended purpose allows" 
(Article 4(1)(b)). This not only renders research quintessentially a utilitarian 
endeavor; but, more notably, it creates a structural deficit to the detriment 
of animals. The balance of interests ends up being merely perfunctory and 
legitimizes, in essence rubber-stamps, the exploitation of animals (Ferrari and 
Gerritsen, 2015, p. 140; Gerritsen, 2015, p. 38). 
A prime example of the inherent deficiency created by rights versus protec­
tion is the German state objective of animal protection. Prior to the amend­
ment of Article 20a of German Basic Law, scholars viewed the German Basic 
Law as a "constant obstacle" (Evans, p. 326) to the effective protection of animals 
and were hopeful that the constitutionalization of animal protection, even 
if it would not create justiciable rights, would put animal protection on par 
with constitutional rights, as regards governmental value judgments ( Gerick, 
2005, p. 120 ). Judiciary practice established since the norm's amendment in 
2002, however, shows that the state objective is regularly subordinated to con­
stitutional rights ( German Administrative Court, 2006; German Constitutional 
Court, 2009; German Constitutional Court, 2006; see further Eisen and Stilt, 
2017, note 25). The deficiency again is that the balances of interests do not 
even examine the interests that underlie legal tools. They fail, for example, to 
acknowledge that what we may be balancing are interests in not being tor­
tured versus interests in making economic profit. Instead, these tests balance 
interests only with reference to legal tools that protect those interests ( rights 
versus protections )-a practice that structurally favors all human interests in 
using animals, over all interests of animals in not being used. 
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The first step towards ensuring a less biased balance of interests is to clearly 
differentiate between a scientific evaluation of whether animals are required 
to obtain a scientific result, and an ethical evaluation of whether it is morally 
justifiable in each individual case to inflict a certain kind of suffering upon an 
animal for a certain kind of desired objective. The second step to reforming 
these tests is leveling the position of competing interests, by establishing a reli­
able framework for a qualitative and non-speciesist balance of interests. Such 
a qualitative balance of interests demands that identical interests be viewed 
identically, regardless of the holder of the interest, i.e., be it the interests of hu­
mans or the interests of animals (Ferrari and Gerritsen, 2015, p. 139; Robertson, 
2015, p. 102 ). Balancing qualities of the interests at stake should, in principle, 
prevent marginal research interests from trumping interests in bodily integrity. 
5 Reform Proposal 3: Animal Rights 
5.1 Why Reverse Hierarchies and Upgraded Balances of Interests Do Not 
Suffice 
Even if replacement is considered the primary aim of the 3Rs, and even if we 
considerably revamp the balance of interests test, the 3Rs will likely continue to 
fail. The odds against this test are so high because its logic is flawed. The golden 
standard in animal experimentation is the animal model. The animal model 
poses ethical problems, has never been validated as a research method, and 
is strongly criticized for lacking sufficient predictive value to draw inferences 
about human models ( e.g., Baker, 2016; Bailey, Thew and Balls, 2014; Greek and 
Menache, 2013; Knight, 2011; Mcivor, 2019, Chapter 5 in this Volume). Despite 
these apparent flaws and the structural deficiencies of the animal model, under 
the 3Rs, a non-animal model not only needs to be as "effective" as the animal model, 
but ( unlike the animal model) it actually needs to work. As Greek points out, this 
means we are " [w]aiting to abandon a test that does not work until we can 
find one that does" (Greek, 2015). A recently published report by the Scien­
tific Committee on Health Environmental and Emerging Risks (SC HEER)  on the 
need for non-human primates in research even posits that alternative models, 
which are to be validated against existing animal models, will require-from 
a legal perspective-using more animals in the validation process ( S C HEER, 
2017, pp. 20, 56). The odds are thus high that the 3Rs will perpetuate the use of 
animals in research. A final and crucial lex ferenda change that may overturn 
this deeply ingrained imbalance requires restructuring protections as rights. 
5.2 Prohibitions as Rights? 
Some scholars argue that animals already have at least some rights by arguing 
that prohibitions are negative freedom rights of animals. Section 85 paragraph 1 
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of the New Zealand Animal Welfare Act (1999), for example, provides that 
" [  n ]o  person may carry out any research, testing, or teaching involving the use 
of a non-human hominid unless such use has first been approved by the Direc­
tor-General and the research, testing, or teaching is carried out in accordance 
with any conditions imposed by the Director-General" (Section 85(1)). From 
the general prohibition on using hominids for research, testing, or teaching, 
some infer that hominids have the right not to be infringed in their life and 
bodily and mental integrity. Wagman and Liebman (2011), for example, argue 
that "the ban on certain conduct seems to grant the affected animals the 'right' 
to be free of such conduct. Because of animals' status as property in every juris­
diction, those rights are naturally limited" (pp. 261; see also McCausland, 2014, 
p. 27; Robertson, 2015, pp. 3, 5; Sunstein, 2004, p. 99; Waldau, 2011). 
If we look at the laws that regulate research on animals, there are several 
prohibitions that could be posited as negative freedom rights. According to 
Article 8(2) and (3) of Directive 2010/63/EU, there is a prohibition of the use 
of great apes and non-human primates for research purposes ( cf. European 
Parliament, 2010, Recital 18). Exceptions are stated in Article 8(2)(a) and (b) for 
non-human primates and in Article 55(2) for great apes. The Australian Policy 
on the Use of Non-Human Primates for Scientific Purposes (National Health and 
Medical Research Council, 2003), which declares that research on great apes 
is legal under narrow conditions, is also sometimes considered to enshrine a 
freedom right of great apes to not be used in research. Similar prohibitions/ 
rights exist in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, 
and other states ( Goldner, 2014 ). Another type of negative freedom right can be 
seen in the EU-wide prohibition of experiments that result in severe pain, suf­
fering, or distress for animals and which are likely to be long-lasting (European 
Parliament, 2010, Article 15(2)). However, these prohibitions are undermined 
when Member States choose to allow such procedures temporarily (Europe­
an Parliament, 2010, Article 55(2)-(3)). Member states may, however, decline 
to adopt exceptions, which scholars support by arguing that certain levels of 
suffering should not be permitted under any circumstances, regardless of any 
likely or aspired benefits (Zurlo, Rudacille and Goldberg, 1996). Another type 
of prohibition is the ban on subjecting vertebrates to research without anes­
thesia when experiments result in serious injuries (European Parliament, 20101 
Article 14(1), Sentence 2). Prohibitions may also preclude certain purposes 
from justifying animal use in research. Under Puerto Rican law, for example, 
animal experiments are prohibited if they are done for educational purposes 
( e.g., Puerto Rico Animal Welfare Act, 2008, Article 19(b ); see also Swiss Animal 
Welfare Ordinance, 2008, Article 138( 2) ). 
Prohibitions are a major step forward for animals, making certain spe­
cies of animals unavailable to human disposition. In this sense, prohibitions 
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effectively preempt balances of interests: None of the specified procedures 
are prima facie available to be overridden by human interests. But these pro­
hibitions apply only to a minority of animals ( e.g., to iconic or endangered 
animals) and continue to be undermined by broad exceptions, which in tum 
promote the continuing use of a majority of animals in research. 
5.3 The Need for Animal Rights 
The whole idea that the duties of some can be translated into the rights of 
others (to whom the duty is owed); and, thus, that prohibitions are negative 
freedom rights of animals, is disputed in legal scholarship ( Curnutt, 2001, 
pp. 19ff., 26ff.; Raspe, 2013, p. 282 ). Contrary to Wagman and Liebman's perspec­
tive is the view that specified norms are prohibitions, no more, no less. Rights 
are only established by unequivocally identifying them as such ( e.g., "hominids 
have a right to life and a right to bodily and mental integrity"). Instead of opt­
ing for limited prohibitions that are undermined by numerous and sweeping 
exceptions, the only way to begin attending to the fundamental interests of 
animals is to establish rights for them. Rights are those rare tools that ensure 
that interests are qualitatively balanced, and that the balance is egalitarian and 
non-speciesist. As Peters ( 2016) argues: " [  A ]nimal rights would allow a fair bal­
ancing in which the proper value of fundamental animal interests ( such as the 
interest to live) could be integrated. Animal rights would therefore preclude 
the current routine sacrifice of fundamental animal interests in favor of trite 
human interests" (p. 49 ). The demand for fundamental rights for animals is 
neither utopian nor far-fetched; it is the only option available to move away 
from our prevailing perfunctory consideration of animals. Particularly in re­
search, where balance of interest tests prevail, establishing rights for animals 
is indispensable if we seriously want to start envisaging an end to their use in 
experimentation. 
Another notable aspect about rights is that they ensure that rights holders 
have a sphere of absolute unavailability. In human rights law, this is known 
as the very substance of a right that may not be restricted or impaired in any 
way (e.g., European Economic Community, 1957, Article 2; Swiss Constitution, 
1999, Article 36(4)). Because animals, under the laws of most states, are de­
nied rights, human interests in exploiting animals take categorical precedence 
over their most fundamental interests, such as life and freedom. Introducing 
a sphere of inviolability for the most fundamental interests that animals pos­
sess is necessary, if we want to truly take their interests seriously and live up to 
our recognition of their intrinsic value (Peters, 2015, p. 72). A number of laws 
already recognize that the interests of animals matter because these interests 
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matter to them, i.e., that animals have to be protected for their own sake. The 
Dutch Animal Welfare Act (Wet dieren 2011) in this context expresses "recog­
nition of the intrinsic value of the animal" (preamble). Directive 2010/63/EU 
(European Parliament, 2010) enshrines that " [  a ]nimals have an intrinsic value 
which must be respected" (Recital 10) and that they "should always be treated 
as sentient creatures" (Recital 12 ). The intrinsic value of animals is also recog­
nized under German law ( German Animal Welfare Act, 2006, Section 1 ); and 
the preamble to the Latvian Animal Protection Law (1999) states that " [t]he 
ethical obligation of humankind is to ensure the welfare and protection of all 
species of animals, because every unique being is in itself of value". Article 3 
litera a of the Swiss Animal Welfare Act (2005) speaks of the " [i]nherent worth 
of the animal that has to be respected". Thailand's Ethical Principles and Guide­
lines for the Use of Animals (National Research Council of Thailand, 1999) states 
that " [  a ]nimal users are to be aware of the value oflife of animals" (Principle 1), 
and that "animal users need to be aware that animals are living beings just as 
humans are living beings" (Principle 4). The recognition of the intrinsic value 
of animals is not only ethically relevant, but it carries legal implications (Peters, 
2015, p. 70) and should result in rights that protect these individuals' core inter­
ests. Recent case law in India shows that animal rights are on the rise and that 
they are readily implementable. The High Court of Kerala (2000) declared: 
" [L] egal rights shall not be the exclusive preserve of the humans which has to be 
extended beyond people thereby dismantling the thick legal wall with humans 
all on one side and all animals on the other side" (N.R. Nair and Ors v. Union 
of India (um) and Ors, 2000 ); and, "animals are born with an equal claim for 
life without any cruelty to them. Perhaps if this right was given proper recogni­
tion by the human-beings, there would have been no necessity to bring on the 
statute book of the said Act" (People for Animals and Ors. v. State of Goa and 
Ors, 1997). 
Establishing rights, and thereby an essence of inviolability, has a number 
of implications. Akin to Principle 5 of the Nuremberg Code (1949), experi­
ments will not be conducted, "where there is an a priori reason to believe that 
death or disabling injury will occur" because it violates the core content of a 
right to life and bodily and mental integrity. And analogous to Principle 8 of 
the Helsinki Declaration (World Medical Association, 2013), the primary pur­
pose of medical research to generate new knowledge cannot take precedence 
over the rights and interests of individual research subjects. Today, the duty 
to rehabilitate animals-sometimes known as the fourth R-could be taken 
as a useful starting point in this respect. Recital 14 of Directive 2010/63/EU 
states that methods should avoid death ( of animals) as an endpoint. Killing 
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an animal used for a research experiment is only permitted if they remain in 
or have recurrent moderate or severe pain, suffering, distress, or lasting harm 
(European Parliament, 2010, Article 17( 2 ); Government of India, Ministry of 
Environment and Forests, 2007, Annex 6). Article 17 paragraph 3 of Directive 
2010/63/EU further states: "Where an animal is to be kept alive, it shall receive 
care and accommodation appropriate to its state of health." India's Guidelines 
on the Regulation of Scientific Experiments on Animals determine that "investi­
gators are responsible for the aftercare and/or rehabilitation of animals after 
experimentation" ( Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests, 
2007, Annex 6). If states today are willing to determine that death of animals 
used in research should be avoided, it is not unreasonable to consider the pos­
sibility that they will grant animals a right to life in the future. Thereby, the 
rehoming duty would be explicitly reframed as a manifestation of a right to 
life, akin to Principle 5 of the Nuremberg Code (1949). A deficiency of current 
rehoming provisions, however, is that researchers are nudged to use the meth­
od that causes lasting moderate and severe pain, so they can put the animal 
down without having to care for or accommodate them after the conclusion 
of the experiment. To counter these unwarranted disincentives, the costs of 
aftercare and/or rehabilitation of animals post-experimentation should be 
budgeted as a part of research costs when an application is filed ( as required 
by Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2007, Annex 6, 
Principle 4). 
5.4 A Paradigm Shift? 
Animal rights implemented in law would create a paradigm shift because 
they offer specific advantages over protections. Instead of merely establish­
ing specific and context-dependent prohibitions, rights operate more broadly 
and are less determinate. This confers advantages to the rights holder, because 
rights are applicable in a myriad of situations. For example, a right to bodi­
ly and mental integrity applies to the general question of whether use of an 
animal in research is justified. If the answer is yes, then the question must be 
asked whether and how this right can be guaranteed in research ( e.g., by car­
rying out research that does not inflict any form of suffering, including death). 
Moreover, animals are empowered by rights because they, by being actionable, 
grant them access to stronger legal tools of enforcement (Edmundson, 20141 
pp. 345ff., 350; Goldner, 2014, p. 53ff.). Only the enforced duty of others to re­
spect the right in question renders its worthiness palpable (Edmundson, 2014, 
p. 360 ). Establishing a right of animals to life and bodily and mental integrity 
would stop perpetuating the use of animals for research and enable us to achi­
eve the primary goal of the 3Rs: the ultimate replacement of animal models. 
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While funding animal-free alternatives will undoubtedly contribute to this 
goal, as well (see e.g., Swiss Animal Welfare Act, Article 22(2) ;  European Par­
liament, 2010, Recital 46),  only a paradigm change in the law of animals in 
research will stop incentivizing research facilities to continue experiment­
ing on animals and will start enabling them to put all their efforts into find­
ing ethically sound (and more scientifically sound) alternatives to the use of 
animals. 
If industries cannot now devise alternatives to animal models, then certain 
types of research procedures simply should not be carried out until we find 
alternatives. When the Helsinki Declaration (World Medical Association, 2013) 
came into force, legislators deemed acceptable the burden of looking for al­
ternative models to research on humans. The same change of research pro­
cedure is, on the basis of a non-speciesist ethic, reasonable to demand from 
industries that currently rely on animal models. This route is not utopian but 
was taken by lawmakers before, such as when the Eu decided to give full ef­
fect to the Cosmetics Directive (European Commission, 2013, p. 3) .  When dis­
cussing the potential postponement of the 2013 marketing ban on cosmetics, 
since replacement methods for all animal models were not yet available, the 
EC argued that postponing the ban would "diminish determination to swiftly 
develop alternative test methods. Past experience demonstrates clearly that 
animal testing provisions in the cosmetics legislation have been a key accel­
erator in relation to the development of alternative methods and have sent 
a strong signal far beyond the cosmetics sector and far beyond Europe" (Eu­
ropean Commission, 2013, p. 6).  Instead of conceiving rights for animals as a 
scientific regression, industries will be incentivized to finally spur innovation 
towards ethically sound and economically accessible alternatives. 
The E u  Cosmetics Directive has had a positive spill-over effect into other ar­
eas of animal experimentation, alongside further national bans on cosmetics 
testing, including Australia (Australian Government, Department of Health, 
2018) ,  India ( Government of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 
2005, Section 148C),  Israel (Israeli Cruelty to Animals Law 1994, Article 2( d); 
prohibiting cutting into live tissue), Guatemala ( Guatemalan Animal Welfare 
Act 2017, Article 54), New Zealand (New Zealand Animal Welfare Act 1999, 
Section 84A), South Korea (South Korea Animal Protection Law 2007; in force 
2019), and Taiwan (Business Cosmetics, 2016) .  In September 2016, the Dutch 
parliament changed its policy on animal research law in an unprecedented 
way. The parliament passed a motion to phase out all experiments on non­
human primates and declared that by 2025, it aims to operate by testing meth­
ods that do not make use of animals. The policy areas in which the use of 
animals must be phased out until 2025 include regulatory testing of chemicals, 
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food ingredients, pesticides and (veterinary) medicines and biological prod­
ucts, such as vaccines. In the areas of fundamental research, applied and 
transitional research, as well as education and training, by contrast, no such 
specific reference date has been announced. The government's next step is for 
the Dutch National Committee for the Protection of Animals Used for Scien­
tific Purposes (NCad, 2016) to plan a schedule that phases out experiments on 
animals (which applies to all of the above areas). NCad clearly puts emphasis 
on innovation and the development of new research methods rather than the 
abrogation of animal research; yet, its move is historical and will hopefully set 
a precedent for other states to follow. These developments show that the un­
availability of animals for research does not equate with an end to research 
and advances for human benefit but instead, it heralds the beginning of an 
ethically and scientifically sound future for research. If devised as rights in­
stead of bans, these regulatory changes would create more secure and justicia­
ble ground for animals and could enable us to work more effectively towards a 
paradigm change in research. 
6 Concluding Remarks 
The 3Rs are a primary example of regulatory failure, and yet the concept 
enjoys an unparalleled acceptance among states and research institutions 
worldwide. Instead of abrogating the 3Rs (which is demanded by a grow­
ing number of citizens), it would be better to leverage the 3Rs' widespread 
acceptance to enable regulators to fulfil their unachieved regulatory goals 
and meet the growing demands of citizens for a more just relationship with 
animals. 
This chapter proposed means of bringing about paradigm change, that, al­
though few, are powerful. First, regulators must reverse the hierarchy of the 
3Rs, based on a historical, teleological, and evolutionary interpretation, with 
replacement taking precedence. Second, regulators must introduce qualitative 
balances of interests, so identical interests are viewed identically, regardless of 
the interest holder. As a result, marginal scientific or prestige interests cannot 
trump interests in life and bodily and mental integrity. Third, animals must be 
accorded explicit rights to life and bodily and mental integrity, based on our 
legal commitment to protect them for their own sake (intrinsic animal pro­
tection), for the following reasons: rights grant more power to rights holders 
than interests do to interest holders, rights require special justification, give 
effective weight to animal interests in balancing tests, make the core interests 
of animals inviolable to human exploitation, and operate broadly. Although 
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rights will preclude undertaking many research practices that are currently 
conducted on animals, they spur innovation and help make research more ef­
fective and accessible. As the EC (2013) stated with respect to cosmetics, "the 
possible risks from the 2013 marketing ban can be turned into an opportunity 
for the Union to set an example of responsible innovation [ ... ] with positive 
impact beyond Europe" (p. 6). The very same opportunities are available to us 
in research more generally if we begin to embark on a road of innovation and 
progress. 
If these adjustments are incorporated, we anticipate that the 3Rs can of­
fer a valuable approach to overturning the deeply ingrained default rule of 
animal experimentation and to incrementally phase out the use of animals 
in research. But "[f]ully reaping the potential of alternative methods is a 
challenging endeavor that will require a shift in thinking of all involved" (Eu­
ropean Commission, 2013, p. 6; inertia of continued animal use is acknowl­
edged in Innovate UK, 2015, p. 14). Legislators must empower scientists and 
research institutions to take the full replacement road by designing the best 
possible legal framework for it and by giving them the necessary financial in­
centives and education to pursue replacement, instead of holding them mor­
ally responsible for the continued use of animals, which is in fact a regulatory 
failure. 
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